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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and because 
the Respondent has attempted to raise new issues in their opposing brief, the 
Appellant submits the following brief as a reply to the Brief of Respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT IMPROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF 
STANDING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
II. APPELLANT APPROPRIATELY DISCUSSED STATE 




RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL RIGHTTO 
RAISE THE ISSUE OF STANDING ON 
APPEAL. 
In Point I of the argument submitted in the Respondent's Brief, the 
Respondent argues that the Appellant lacks standing to challenge the seizure of the 
four suitcases and presents a lengthy argument regarding Respondent's position on 
standing. 
However, as acknowledged by the Respondent in that argument, this Court is 
precluded from considering that issue on appeal. In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
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1132 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when standing is not raised in 
the lower court, it will not be considered for the first time on appeal. In support of 
its ruling that the issue cannot first be raised on appeal, the Court relied on the cases 
of State v. Grundy, 25 Wash. App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980) and State v. 
Goodman, 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985). In those cases, as here, the 
State tried to initially raise the issue of standing on appeal and was precluded from 
doing so because of failure to raise it in the trial court. See State v. Grundy, 25 
Wash. App. at 415-416, 607 P.2d at 1237. and State v. Goodman, 42 Wash. App. at 
334-335, 711 P.2d at 1060. Additionally, there is Supreme Court precedent to 
support the Schlosser ruling. In Steagald v. United States, 4D7 U.S. 204, 101 
S.Ct. 1642 (1981), the United States Supreme Court declined to consider the issue 
of standing and apparently deemed it waived because the government did not raise 
it or challenge it in the trial court. 
In the present case, the issue of standing was not raised in any of the lower 
court proceedings, either at the suppression hearing, (see transcript thereof) nor in 
the Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress (R. 164-170). 
Therefore, the issue is not properly before this Court. 
This Court should also reject the argument that standing can and should be 
raised sua sponte. In support of that argument, the Re ^pondent cites the case of 
State v. Tuttle, 106 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 66, P.2d (Utah 1989). In that case it is 
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apparent that the issue of standing was raised sua sponte by the appellate court 
because there was no opportunity or need to raise it below. Standing only became 
an issue by virtue of the issues on appeal. Indeed, when standing is an issue of first 
impression and only becomes such when a case reaches the appellate court level, the 
appellate court should have the right to raise the issue sua sponte. That is not the 
case in this proceeding. Standing could have been raised as an issue in the lower 
court. The Respondent's failure to raise it precludes independent review by this 
court at this late juncture. Moreover, as stated in the Supreme Court opinion of 
Schlosser, supra, because standing is substantive and not jurisdictional, it is not 
appropriate to raise the issue at the appellate level. 
As further stated in State v. Schlosser, supra, at page 1138: "It is all but 
axiomatic that a claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State 
v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115 (Utah 1987); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985)". See also the following cases 
precluding parties from raising an issue on appeal that was not raised before the 
lower court. Mascar v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987), Lane v. Messer, 731 
P.2d 488 (Utah 1986), Bundy v. Century Equipment, Inc., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1984), and Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). 
The above-stated rule is a rule of judicial economy. If it is not enforced, the 
appellate court will be overwhelmed with issues for consideration for the first time 
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on appeal leaving no prospect for termination of any litigation. Additionally, any 
issue that hinges on a factual determination or requires factual determination 
should not be raised for the first time in the appellate court. It is inappropriate for 
this Court to establish undeterminedfacts. The appellate court should not beforced 
into the role of fact finder in place of the district court. If the Court adopted this 
role, as it would be required to do if the issue of standing were addressed at this 
juncture, it would be a gross violation of the scheme of appellate review established 
in the Judicial Code of the State of Utah.1 
The Respondent's attempt to bring this new issue before the Court is 
therefore improper and the Court should proceed to hear the merits of this action 
without addressing the issue of standing.2 For all legal purposes of the proceedings, 
this Court should consider that the issue of standing was assumed by both parties 
*If respondent's argument is adopted here, this Court would have to make the 
following factual determinations which are not supported by the record in the lower 
court. Respondent's argument presents a detailed analysis that there is no standing 
because of an abandonment of a property. In doing so, the respondent is attempting 
to have two new issues determined on appeal: First, the issue of abandonment. By 
virtue of the Respondent's argument, that determination must be made before a 
determination on standing is made. The Respondent did not establish, argue or raise 
abandonment in the lower court. (See Suppression Transcript and Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Suppress, (R. pgs. 164-170). Likewise, the trial court did 
not therefore address or make a finding on the issue of abandonment or standing. 
(See Amended Order, R. pgs. 176-177). 
2
 The Respondent seems to acknowledge that it was not an issue in this case in that 
their Statement of Issues presented on appeal does not include standing as an issue. 
(See Brief of Respondent, p. 1-2) 
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throughout the lower court proceedings and therefore resolved therein. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO 
INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITIJTIONAL 
P R O T E C T I O N S IN I T S A N A L Y S I S O F 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. 
The Respondent, in Part II of their Brief, argues that the Appellant should not 
be allowed to argue separate State grounds for the purposes of Constitutional 
analysis of the suppression issue, but rather should be limited to the Federal 
Constitutional standards in its argument on appeal.3 
The Respondent's argument is without merit. The Respondent is confused as 
to the distinction between inappropriately raising a brand new substantive issue on 
appeal, and merely expanding an argument on an issue raised in the trial court. 
Appellant, unlike the Respondent, did not raise a new issue on appeal but merely 
clarified its contention made in the trial court that the State Constitution as well as 
the Federal Constitution was violated in this case. Appellant's expansion of that 
argument in its Brief is, in fact, only an effort to develop more thoroughly, the 
arguments that the State Constitution may have more expansive protections 
regarding search and seizure than the Federal Constitution, an independent analysis 
3It is ironic that in Part II of their brief, the Respondent proposes that this Court 
limit the argument of Appellant by claiming that Appellant improperly raised an 
issue for the first time on appeal, but at the same time asks this Court to allow 
Respondent to do the same in Point I. 
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which the Supreme Court of Utah has encouraged.4 
In arguing that this Court should limit the Appellant to the breadth of its 
argument in the lower court, Respondent is suggesting this Court adopt a rule 
limiting the entire record before it to the Memorandum and/or argument on record 
made in the lower court. Surely they w7ould not propose this Court adopt a position 
that the law is static, that principles argued cannot be expanded upon as a case 
progresses through the court system, and that an individual should be limited to 
certain case law and presentations made in the record below. 
4
 That the Supreme Court is amenable to those arguments and encourages them 
is apparent by the comments of the Supreme Court Justices in the following 
decisions: See Provo City Corporation v. Willdon, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989), 
at 456 fn 2, State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) at 1247, fn 5, State v. 
Earl9 716 P.2d 803 at 805-806 (Utah 1986) where Justice Durham notes that despite 
the Supreme Court's willingness to independently interpret the Utah Constitution 
in other areas of law, the analysis of State Constitutional issues in criminal appeals 
continues to be ignored. Justice Durhamfurther notes that it is imperative that Utah 
lawyers brief this Court on relevant Utah State Constitutional questions. In State 
v. Hyghy 111 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion notes 
that he may not agree "that the scope of warrant requirements under Article I, 
Section 14 is congruent with that developed by the Federal Courts under the Fourth 
Amendment" Id. at 271. There may be other standards of protection under the State 
Constitution in this area that have not been addressed by the Court before because 
of failure of counsel to specifically address the issues separate from the federal 
requirements. That attitude is invoked specifically onthe issue in this case injustice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987). 
Justice Zimmerman notes that "the whole question of the protections that are 
afforded by the remedies available under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, our own search and seizure provision, has never been carefully 
considered by [the appellate] court" Id. at 187. 
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The Appellant's efforts to expand its argument on issues already raised does 
not invoke the rule of law that the Respondent violated in this case, /. e. raising new 
issues on appeal. Contrary to the Respondent's position, this Court should not limit 
the constitutional applications in this case to the Federal Constitutional standards. 
Respondent further argues in Point II of their brief that Article I Section 14 
of the State Constitution affords no greater protection than the Federal 
Constitution, relying on the case of State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) and 
State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326 (Ut. App. 1989). This Court should note that the 
rulings in those cases did not limit the interpretation of Article I Section 14 to the 
protections offered by the Federal Constitution, but merely noted it included the 
same protections. See State v. Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 and State v. Johnson, 711 
P.2d at 327. The opinions did not preclude a more expansive interpretation or 
separate analysis under state law, a position acknowledged by the Utah Supreme 
Court in many cases. See Supra, note 2 and accompanying text. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent in this case, has, on one hand, attempted to raise new issues on 
appeal in degradation of the axiomatic rule of appellate review that issues not raised 
in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. The Respondent next argues that the 
same general rule precludes the Appellant from expanding his argument on an issue 
that was raised in the lower court. The logic of both arguments is a misapplication 
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of the established rules of appellate review. Points I and II of the Respondent's 
Brief should therefore be disregarded by this Court. 
DATED this X ^ f d a y of October, 1989. 
^>, »-^&*— /^SL-
JEROLDD. McPHEE 
t^ X ^ - • - " ^ 7 i&&) 
KRISTINE K. SMITH 
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